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Abstract
We propose a method to revise the neural network
to construct the quaternion-valued neural network
(QNN), in order to prevent intermediate-layer fea-
tures from leaking input information. The QNN
uses quaternion-valued features, where each el-
ement is a quaternion. The QNN hides input
information into a random phase of quaternion-
valued features. Even if attackers have obtained
network parameters and intermediate-layer fea-
tures, they cannot extract input information with-
out knowing the target phase. In this way, the
QNN can effectively protect the input privacy. Be-
sides, the output accuracy of QNNs only degrades
mildly compared to traditional neural networks,
and the computational cost is much less than other
privacy-preserving methods.
The QNN can be further extended to rotation-
equivariant neural networks based on d-ary
hypercomplex-valued features with better perfor-
mance (Zhang et al., 2020).
1. Introduction
It is often the case that the raw data collected for deep
learning cannot be processed locally, so that features are
extracted and processed elsewhere. The privacy leakage
of those features have been receiving wide attention re-
cently. Many works such as (Dosovitskiy & Brox, 2016;
Zeiler & Fergus, 2014; Mahendran & Vedaldi, 2015; Shokri
et al., 2017; Ganju et al., 2018; Melis et al., 2018; Zhang
et al., 2019) have pointed out that, attackers can recover
significant amount of sensitive input information from the
intermediate-layer features of a DNN. As countermeasures,
several studies (Osia et al., 2017; Li et al., 2017; Wang et al.,
2018; Zhang et al., 2016; Mohassel & Zhang, 2017) have
been proposed, but have limited applicability mostly due to
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Figure 1. Overview of the QNN. The encoder module (I) is located
at the local device. The traditional real-valued feature a is extracted
and converted into a quaternion-valued tensor for encryption. The
quaternion-valued feature is rotated by θ. The rotated feature is
processed by the processing module (II) which satisfies the rotation
equivariance property. The decoder module (III) uses θ to decrypt
features to get the final result.
the exorbitant computational cost.
The task of attribute obfuscation and privacy protection on
deep neural networks mainly propose the following two
requirements: First, even if attackers have obtained network
parameters and intermediate-layer features, they should not
be able to reconstruct the input or infer private attributes
of inputs. Second, the privacy-protection method is not
supposed to increase the computational cost, or affect the
task accuracy significantly.
Therefore, we propose a generic method to revise a tradi-
tional neural network to a quaternion-valued neural network
(QNN) to meet the above two requirements. Unlike tradi-
tional neural networks, features of the QNN are expressed
by quaternion-valued vectors/matrix/tensors. Quaternion
is a number system extended from the complex number,
which include three imaginary parts and is expressed by
q=q0+q1i+q2j+q3k.
For privacy protection, we hide the input information into a
random phase of quaternion-valued features (like the phase
of a complex value) in the intermediate-layer of the QNN.
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The phase can be considered as the private key. Attackers
without knowing the target phase cannot recover the input
information from quaternion-valued features.
Fig. 1 shows the architecture of the QNN. It consists of an
encoder, a processing module, and a decoder. The encoder
extracts the real-valued feature, converts it into a quaternion-
valued feature, and hides the input information in a target
phase as the encryption process. The quaternion-valued
feature is sent to the processing module for further process.
The decoder decrypts the processed feature and computes
the result. In order to enable the successful decryption of
the decoder, the processing module has to ensure rotation
equivariance. I.e. if the encoder rotates the target phase
containing input information by a certain angle, the phases
containing the input information in all layers of the process-
ing module are rotated by the same angle. To achieve that,
we need to revise layerwise operations in the neural net-
work, including ReLU, batch-normalization, etc. to ensure
the rotation equivariance property. However, by exhaustive
searching, the attacker is still likely to recover the target
phase in quaternion-valued features. Hence we further ob-
fuscate the target phase by adversarial learning. I.e. the
GAN generates quaternion-valued features to obfuscate the
attacker.
The network revision can be broadly applied to DNNs with
different architectures for various tasks. Experimental re-
sults showed that our QNNs outperformed other baselines
in terms of privacy protection, yet the accuracy was not
significantly affected.
Our contributions are summarized as follows: We propose
a generic method to revise traditional networks into QNNs,
which preserves input privacy by hiding sensitive informa-
tion in a randomly chosen phase. Without knowing the
phase, attackers can hardly infer any input information from
features. Yet, anyone with the phase information can easily
obtain correct outputs without much accuracy loss. Most
importantly, QNNs incur far less computational overhead
than crypto-based methods.
The QNN can be further extended to rotation-equivariant
neural networks based on d-ary hypercomplex-valued fea-
tures with better performance (Zhang et al., 2020).
2. Related work
Complex-valued and quaternion-valued neural net-
works. Quaternions are a system extended from traditional
complex numbers (Hamilton, 1848). (Reichert & Serre,
2014) applied complex-valued neurons to build richer, ver-
satile representations in neural networks. (Danihelka et al.,
2016) proposed a method to augment recurrent neural net-
works with associative memory based on complex-valued
vectors, which achieved faster learning on multiple mem-
orization tasks. According to (Trabelsi et al., 2018), using
complex-valued parameters and complex-valued features in
neural networks can achieve competitive performance with
real-valued networks.
There are also several studies on quaternion-valued net-
works. (Zhu et al., 2018) represented color image and con-
volutional kernels in the quaternion domain to build quater-
nion convolutional neural networks, which outperformed
real-valued neural networks in image classification and de-
noising tasks. (Parcollet et al., 2019) built quaternion recur-
rent neural networks and quaternion long-short term mem-
ory neural networks, and achieved a better performance
than real-valued networks. (Kendall et al., 2015) localized
the camera with the help of quaternions. In this paper, we
convert intermediate-layer real-valued features of a tradi-
tional neural network into quaternion-valued features of a
QNN, and hide the input information into a random phase
for privacy protection. Unlike (Zhu et al., 2018; Parcollet
et al., 2019), the QNN uses real-valued parameters, instead
of quaternion-valued parameters.
Privacy protection in deep learning. Several studies have
been proposed to protect privacy in deep learning. (Osia
et al., 2017) used Siamese fine-tuning to reduce the level of
sensitive information in the input, so that attackers cannot in-
fer private properties using intermediate-layer features. (Li
et al., 2017) proposed the PrivyNet to explore the trade-off
between the privacy protection and the task accuracy. (Wang
et al., 2018) applied a lightweight privacy protection mech-
anism consisting of data nullification and random noise
addition. Homomorphic encryption is a cryptographic tech-
nique, which can be applied in the privacy protection in
deep learning. (Zhang et al., 2016) used the BGV encryption
scheme to encrypt data, and used the high-order backprop-
agation algorithm for training. (Mohassel & Zhang, 2017)
distributed data among two non-colluding servers, where
the model was trained using secure two-party computation.
(Xiang et al., 2019) used complex-valued neural networks
to protect privacy. Inspired by the homomorphic encryption,
we use QNNs. Crucially, compared with the homomorphic
encryption, QNNs will not boost the computational cost
significantly.
3. Algorithm
3.1. Quaternion
Quaternion is a number system extended from the complex
number. Unlike the complex number, a quaternion consists
of three imaginary parts q1i, q2j, q3k, and one real part q0,
which is given as q = q0 + q1i+ q2j + q3k. If the real part
of a quaternion is zero (q0 = 0), we call it a pure quaternion.
The quaternion subject to ||q|| =
√
q20 + q
2
1 + q
2
2 + q
2
3 = 1
is termed a unit quaternion. The products of basis ele-
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ments i, j, k are given as i2 = j2 = k2 = ijk = −1,
and ij = k, jk = i, ki = j, ji = −k, kj = −i,
ik = −j. Note that the multiplication of two imaginary
parts is non-commutative, i.e. ij 6= ji, jk 6= kj, ki 6= ik.
Each quaternion has a polar decomposition. The polar
decomposition of a unit quaternion is defined as eo
θ
2 =
cos θ2 + sin
θ
2 (o1i+ o2j + o3k), s.t.
√
o21 + o
2
2 + o
2
3 = 1.
When we use a pure quaternion q = 0 + q1i+ q2j + q3k
to represent a point [q1, q2, q3]T ∈ R3 in a 3D space, the
rotation of the point around the axis o = o1i+o2j+o3k, s.t.√
o21 + o
2
2 + o
2
3 = 1, by the angle θ can be represented as
RqR, where R = eo
θ
2 , and R = e−o
θ
2 is the conjugation
of R.
Given a pure quaternion-valued vector x = 0 + ai+ bj +
ck ∈ Hn, and a real-valued vector w ∈ Rn, we have
xTw =
n∑
v=1
xvwv = 0 + (a
Tw)i+ (bTw)j + (cTw)k (1)
3.2. Overview of the QNN
In this paper, we revise a traditional DNN to construct a
QNN. As Fig. 2 shows, we split the QNN into the following
three modules:
• Encoder module: The encoder module is usually de-
ployed at the local device. The encoder module extracts
traditional real-valued features from the input, and encodes
these real-valued features into quaternion-valued features,
where each feature element is a quaternion. The encoder
uses a specific phase of the quaternion-valued feature to
encode the input information, i.e. the input information is
hidden inside the target phase of each quaternion feature
element. Information in other phases of the quaternion fea-
ture element represents noises to obfuscate attackers. We
consider the target phase as a private key. Without the pri-
vate key (the target phase), the attacker cannot invert the
quaternion-valued back into the input. Then, the encoder
module sends the encrypted quaternion-valued feature to
the processing module. The target phase is kept by the local
device. Note that parameters in the QNN are real-valued,
instead of quaternion-valued.
• Processing module: The processing module is sup-
posed to be deployed at the computation center, e.g. the
cloud, where data can be processed efficiently. The pro-
cessing module deals with the quaternion-valued feature
received from the encoder module. All intermediate-layer
features in the processing module are quaternion-valued.
The processing module is not given the target phase, which
encodes the input information. The task of privacy protec-
tion requires the layerwise processing of quaternion-valued
features in the processing module to ensure the rotation
equivariance property. I.e. the input information is hidden
inside the same phase of all quaternion-valued features of all
g
Decoder Module
@ local device
Processing Module
@ computation center
Attacker
Encoder Module
@ local device
d
Adversarial learning
Figure 2. Architecture of the QNN. The QNN is divided into three
modules: the encoder module, the processing module, and the
decoder module. The encoder module extracts real-valued fea-
tures from the input, and transform it into a quaternion-valued
feature. The input information is hidden into a random phase of
the quaternion-valued feature. The processing module deals with
quaternion-valued features without knowing the target phase. The
decoder module decrypts the input information with the target
phase to get the final result.
layers in the processing module. In this way, the processing
module sends the output quaternion-valued feature to the
decoder module.
• Decoder module: The decoder module is deployed at
the local device. Because of the rotation equivariance of the
processing module, the decoder module can use the target
phase to decrypt the input information from the received
quaternion-valued feature.
3.3. Detailed design of the QNN
In this section, we introduce a set of basic rules to transform
a traditional neural network into a QNN. We only revise
the traditional real-valued feature to the quaternion-valued
feature. But parameters in the QNN, e.g. weights in a filter,
are still real numbers instead of quaternions.
Encoder: Given an input I ∈ I, the encoder module g
computes a traditional real-valued feature a as follows.
a = g(I) ∈ Rn (2)
Then the encoder module uses a and two fooling coun-
terparts b, c to generate a quaternion-valued feature x =
0 + ai + bj + ck ∈ Hn. Each element in x is a quater-
nion. Note that we can equivalently let b = g(I) or
c = g(I) without loss of generality. We encrypt the
quaternion-valued feature by rotating x along a random
axis o = 0 + o1i+ o2j+ o3k by a random rotation angle θ,
o1, o2, o3 ∈ R, ||o|| = 1, and obtain the encrypted feature
f ∈ Hn as follows.
f = ΨR(a) = R ◦ x ◦R = R ◦ (0 + ai+ bj + ck) ◦R (3)
where ΨR(·) denotes the function which applies a random
rotation R to the original quaternion-valued feature x, R =
eo
θ
2 = cos θ2 + sin
θ
2 (o1i + o2j + o3k), and ◦ denotes the
element-wise multipication. The encrypted feature f will
be sent to the processing module Φ. In this way, we can
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consider RiR as the target phase, which encodes the input
information, and R can be taken as the private key.
Processing module: Inspired by homomorphic encryption,
we revise the operation of each layer in the processing mod-
ule to satisfy rotation equivariance of the quaternion-valued
feature. The rotation equivariance property ensures that
the input information is always encoded in the same phase
of all quaternion-valued features of all layers in the pro-
cessing module. In this way, the decoder module can use
the target phase to decrypt the input information from the
quaternion-valued feature.
The rotation equivariance property can be summarized as
follows. If we use R ◦ x ◦R to rotate quaternion-valued
feature x along the axis o by the angle θ, then quaternion-
valued feature elements in each intermediate layer of the
processing module are supposed to be rotated along the
same axis by the same angle, as follows.
Φ(R ◦ x ◦R) = R ◦Φ(x) ◦R (4)
Let us consider h0 = Φ(x) without the rotation as the out-
put of the processing module, i.e. θ = 0, R = eo
θ
2 = 1.
The input information is hidden in the imaginary part i.
Since all parameters in the processing module are real-
valued, according to Equation (1), the output of the pro-
cessing module can be represented in the form
h0 = Φ(x) = 0 + (Aa)i+ (Ab)j + (Ac)k. (5)
A is a real-valued matrix that represents effects that com-
bine all non-linear transformations in Φ(x), when Φ(x)
only uses ReLU as non-linear layers. In this way, the input
information is still hidden in the imaginary part i of h0.
Then, let us consider the rotation R, h = Φ(R ◦ x ◦R).
According to Equations (4) and (5), the output is given as
h = Φ(R ◦ x ◦R) = R ◦ h0 ◦R
= (RiR) ◦ (Aa) + (RjR) ◦ (Ab) + (RkR) ◦ (Ac)
(6)
In this way, the input information is hidden in the phase
RiR of h. To ensure the above rotation equivariance, we
recursively ensure rotation equivariance of the layerwise
operation of each layer inside the processing module. The
processing module can be represented as cascaded layers
Φ(f) = ΦL(ΦL−1(· · ·Φ1(f)), where Φl(·) denotes the l-
th layer in the processing model. Let f ′ denote the input
feature of the l-th layer, then the layerwise operation is
supposed to satisfy
Φl(R ◦ f ′ ◦R) = R ◦ Φl(f ′) ◦R. (7)
Thus, this equation recursively ensures rotation equivariance
in Equation (4).
In this paper, we revise the operation of each layer to satisfy
both Equation (6) and (7). We consider six most widely-
used layers, including the convolutional layer, the ReLU
layer, the batch-normalization layer, the avg/max-pooling
layer, the dropout layer, and the skip-connection operation.
Convolutional layer (or fully-connected layer): For the
convolutional layer, we remove the bias term, and get
Conv(f) = w⊗ f. Note that this revision can also be applied
to the fully-connected layer, since the fully-connected layer
can be considered as a special convolutional layer.
ReLU: We revise the ReLU layer as follows.
ReLU(fv) =
‖fv‖
max{‖fv‖, C} · fv (8)
where C denotes a positive scalar; fv ∈ H is the v-th
element in the quaternion-valued feature f .
Batch-normalization: We revise the batch-normalization
operation as follows.
norm(f (k)v ) =
f
(k)
v√
Ek′ [‖f (k′)v ‖2] + 
(9)
where f (k)v denotes the v-th quaternion-valued element in
the k-th sample in the batch.  denotes a small positive
scalar to prevent f (k)v from being divided by zero.
Avg/Max-pooling: Avg-pooling layers satisfy Equation (7)
without any revisions. The max-pooling layer selects the
quaternion feature element with the largest norm from the
receptive field. We revise the max-pooling layer as follows.
maxpool(f) = f ◦m, wheref ∈ Hn′ ,m ∈ {0, 1}n′ (10)
If the i-th element in f is selected (the selected quaternion
feature element has the largest norm from the receptive
field), then mi = 1; otherwise, mi = 0.
Dropout: We randomly dropout several quaternion-valued
elements in the feature. The real part and three imaginary
parts of dropped elements will all be set to zero.
Skip connection: The skip connection can be formulated
as f + Φ(f). If Φ(f) satisfies Equation (7), then the skip
connection will also satisfy Equation (7).
All above revised operations satisfy Equation (7).
Decoder: Let h = Φ(f). Let d denote the decoder mod-
ule, which can be implemented as a shallow network or a
simple softmax layer. The decoder module can get the final
result yˆ as follows.
yˆ = d(Ψ−1R (h)), Ψ
−1
R (h) = Imi(R ◦ h ◦R) (11)
where Ψ−1R (·) indicates the inverse function of ΨR(·). The
rotation in Equation (11) is the inverse of the rotation in
Equation (3). Imi(·) denotes the operation that picks the i
part from quaternions, and returns a real-valued feature.
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3.4. Encoder based on GAN
To further boost the robustness to attacks, we need to adopt
adversarial learning to learn an encoder. In adversarial
learning, we use an encoder to generate quaternion-valued
features to fool the attacker from obtaining the target phase.
Therefore, we use a GAN to train the encoder.
The GAN (Goodfellow et al., 2014) includes a generator
and a discriminator. In this paper, the generator can be
viewed as the encoder module, while the discriminator can
be viewed as the attacker. On the one hand, the generator
generates quaternion-valued features that satisfy: 1. features
contain enough information for the task; 2. features in the
target phase and features in the other phase follow the same
distribution, so that the discriminator cannot distinguish
which phase contains the input information. On the other
hand, the discriminator learns to distinguish the target phase
that encodes input information.
Given an input I ∈ I and its real-valued feature a = g(I)
from the generator, we can encrpyt it with R as f =
ΨR(a) = R ◦ (0 + ai + bj + ck) ◦ R, where b, c are
fooling counterparts that do not contain input information.
The attacker tries to estimate the most probable phase to
decrypt f , and get a. Let R′ denote the rotation estimated
by the attacker, and a′ denote the decrypted feature, i.e.
a′ = Ψ−1R′ (f) = Imi(R′ ◦ f ◦R′). a and a′ are inputs of
the discriminator D, and the discriminator needs to learn to
distinguish a and a′. The generator g and the discrimina-
tor D are trained jointly. We adopt the WGAN (Arjovsky
et al., 2017) to train the generator and the discriminator as
follows.
min
g
max
D
L(g,D) = EI [D(a)− ER′ 6=R[D(a′)]]
= EI [D(a)− ER′ 6=R[D(Ψ−1R′ (ΨR(a)))]
(12)
To jointly optimize the GAN loss and the task loss, the
overall loss is written as follows.
min
g,Φ,d
max
D
Loss = min
g,Φ,d
[max
D
L(g,D) + Ltask(yˆ, y)] (13)
where Ltask is the loss for the task, and y is the ground-truth
label. As for fooling parts b and c, we compute them as
b = g(I ′) and c = g(I ′′) to simplify the implementation,
where I ′ and I ′′ denote images different from I .
3.5. Attackers to QNNs
We design two types of attackers to test the performance of
the privacy protection of QNNs.
Feature inversion attackers: Let the attacker retrieve
quaternion-valued features in the processing module. The
feature inversion attacker usually trains another neural net-
work to reconstruct the input. In this paper, we implement
two versions of feature inversion attackers.
• The first inversion attacker aims to estimate the target
phase of the quaternion-valued feature, which encodes the
input information, i.e. to estimate R′. Then the attacker
reconstructs the input using the feature decrypted with R′,
a′ = Ψ−1R′ (f). The attacker learns another neural network
to reconstruct the input, i.e. Iˆ = dec1(a′).
Thus, the core technique is to enumerate all phases, and
train a classifier D′ to judge whether the decrypted feature
a′ encodes the input information. The classifierD′ is similar
to the discriminator D in the GAN.
• The second feature inversion attacker directly uses the
encrypted quaternion-valued feature to reconstruct the input.
The attacker is trained and tested with f = ΨR(a), i.e.
Iˆ = dec2(f) = dec2(ΨR(a)).
Property inference attackers: According to (Ganju et al.,
2018), the “property” refers to the input attribute. We design
the first property inference attacker to use the intermediate-
layer feature to infer sensitive attributes of inputs. For ex-
ample, if we train a neural network for the age recognition
task, then the property such as gender and race should also
be hidden in intermediate-layer features. In this paper, we
test four versions of property inference attackers.
• The first property inference attacker trains a classifier,
which uses the quaternion-valued feature to infer sensitive
attributes of the input. Specifically, the attacker decrypts f
using an estimated R′ as a′ = Ψ−1R′ (f). The classifier D
′
is used to judge whether the decrypted feature a′ encodes
the input information. The attacker learns another classifier
to estimate attr = net(I). The attacker trains the classifier
using pairs of inputs and their attributes, (I, attr), and tests
the classifier using the reconstructed input Iˆ .
The property inference attacker is supposed to deal with
quaternion-valued features of any layer in the processing
module. However, all intermediate-layer features are com-
puted based on the input feature f , which contains the
richest information of the input. To simplify the implemen-
tation, we only consider hacking the feature f in this paper.
This is uniformly applied to the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th attackers.
• The second property inference attacker is similar to the
first property inference attacker. The only difference is that
the attacker trains the classifier using pairs of the decrypted
feature a′ and ground-truth attributes, (a′, attr). I.e. the
attacker learns the classifier attr = net(a′), and is tested
using the obtained a′ during the attack process.
• The third property inference attacker is similar to the
first property inference attacker. The attacker learns the
classifier using annotations of reconstructed inputs and at-
tributes, (Iˆ , attr), i.e. attr = net(Iˆ). The classifier is tested
using the reconstructed inputs Iˆ .
• The forth property inference attacker applies the k-
nearest neighbors (k-NNs) instead of a neural network to
infer sensitive attributes. For images whose decrypted fea-
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Figure 3. Alignment of architectures between neural networks.
tures a′ are close to each other in the feature space, we
consider these images have similar attributes. In this way,
the attacker uses the k-nearest neighbors in the feature space
to infer the sensitive attributes.
3.6. K-anonymity
Interestingly, we can analyze the performance of the QNN
from the perspective of the k-anonymity. K-anonymity
means that when attackers try to reconstruct an input from
the quaternion-valued feature, they can get at least k differ-
ent results, while only one of them is the correct input. We
visualize the decrypted result Iˆ obtained from the feature
inversion attacker or the property inference attacker for anal-
ysis. Fig. 5 shows reconstructed inputs from different phases
with similar confidence estimated by the attacker. Table 6
shows that the QNN can roughly achieve the k-anonymity.
4. Experiments
In this section, we conducted a series of experiments to test
QNNs. We converted a number of classic neural networks
into QNNs. Theoretically, the QNN can be applied to dif-
ferent tasks. In this paper, we tested QNNs on tasks include
object classification and face attribute estimation, consid-
ering both the feature inversion attacker and the property
inference attacker.
We trained QNNs using the CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100
datasets (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009), which contained
small images, for object classification. Besides, we used
the CUB200-2011 dataset (Wah et al., 2011) and the
CelebA dataset (Liu et al., 2015) for object classifica-
tion and face attributes estimation with large image. We
revised classic neural networks into QNNs, which in-
cluded LeNet (LeCun et al., 1998), residual networks (He
et al., 2016), VGG-16 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2015), and
AlexNet (Krizhevsky et al., 2012).
Network architectures: Fig. 3 compares architectures be-
tween the original neural network and its corresponding
QNN. The encoder/processing/decoder modules of each
original neural network are introduced as follows. For the
LeNet, the encoder consisted of all layers before the second
convolutional layer, and there was only a softmax-layer in
the decoder. For the residual network, the encoder consisted
of all layers before the first 16×16 feature map. The decoder
consisted of all layers after the first 8× 8 feature map. For
the AlexNet, the encoder consisted of the first convolutional
layers, and the decoder consisted of fully-connected layers
and the softmax layer. For the VGG-16, all layers before the
last 56× 56 feature map compromised the encoder, and the
decoder consisted of fully-connected layers and the softmax
layer. Note that for each encoder, we add the GAN at the
end of the encoder.
Baselines: We proposed four baselines for comparison. As
shown in the second row of Fig. 3, the original network
without any revision was used as the first baseline which was
denoted as Original DNN. We divided the original network
into encoder, processing module, and decoder in the same
way as QNN. The third row of Fig. 3 shows the second
baseline. Noise addition could also be used for privacy
protection. We added noises to the output a of the encoder,
i.e. a + γ, where  denoted a random noise vector, and
γ was a scalar. The second baseline was denoted as Noisy
DNN, and we trained Noisy DNN with γ = 0.2, 0.5, 1.0.
The third baseline is shown in the last row of Fig. 3, which
was denoted as w/ additional layers. Since the insertion
of the GAN increased the layer number of the QNN. For a
fair comparison, we also added the GAN architecture into
the baseline network, but the baseline network was learned
without the GAN loss. The forth baseline was the (Xiang
et al., 2019), which was constructed using the same division
of modules of the QNN. For simplicity, the forth baseline
was denoted as Complex NN. Theoretically speaking, QNNs
had more potential phases to hide the input information
than Complex NNs, and used more fooling counterparts to
obfuscate attackers. Besides, the rotation in 3D space was
more complicated than rotation in 2D space. Therefore, the
QNNs were supposed to have a better privacy protection
performance than Complex NNs.
Attack: We applied two kinds of attackers in Sec. 3.5.
• Inversion Attack: The inversion attacker was implemented
based on U-Net (Ronneberger et al., 2015).We revised the
U-Net to construct the attacker for inversion attacks. The
intermediate-layer feature was upsampled to the size of the
input, which was fed into the inversion model. There were
four down-sample blocks and four up-sample blocks. Each
block had six convolutional layers for better performance.
The output of the inversion model had the same size as the
input. We used intermediate-layer features from QNNs as
the input of the attacker. In this way, we used the U-Net
to construct both the first inversion attacker and the second
inversion attacker, according to Sec. 3.5. The first inver-
sion attacker trained the attacker with real-valued features,
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Table 1. Classification error rates and reconstruction errors indicating the capacity of privacy protection.
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w/ additional
layers
Complex
NN QNN
R
ec
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
E
rr
or
s
Original
DNN
w/ additional
layers
Complex
dec(a′)
Complex
dec(x)
Quaternion
dec(a′)
Quaternion
dec(x)
ResNet-20 CIFAR-10 11.56 9.68 10.91 9.21 0.0906 0.1225 0.2664 0.2420 0.3014 0.2702
ResNet-32 CIFAR-10 11.13 9.67 10.48 9.82 0.0930 0.1171 0.2569 0.2412 0.2813 0.2412
ResNet-44 CIFAR-10 10.67 9.43 11.08 9.54 0.0933 0.1109 0.2746 0.2419 0.3123 0.2421
ResNet-56 CIFAR-10 10.17 9.16 11.53 9.24 0.0989 0.1304 0.2804 0.2377 0.3083 0.2403
ResNet-110 CIFAR-10 10.19 9.14 11.97 9.31 0.0896 0.1079 0.3081 0.2495 0.3028 0.2379
R
ec
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
E
rr
or
s
Model Dataset
Original
DNN
w/additional
layers
Noisy DNN
γ = 0.2
Noisy DNN
γ = 0.5
Noisy DNN
γ = 1.0
Complex
dec(a′)
Complex
dec(x)
Quaternion
dec(a′)
Quaternion
dec(x)
LeNet CIFAR-10 0.0769 0.1208 0.0948 0.1076 0.1274 0.2405 0.2353 0.2877 0.2303
LeNet CIFAR-100 0.0708 0.1314 0.0950 0.1012 0.1286 0.2700 0.2483 0.2996 0.2528
ResNet-56 CIFAR-100 0.0929 0.1029 0.1461 0.1691 0.2017 0.2593 0.2473 0.3057 0.2592
ResNet-110 CIFAR-100 0.1050 0.1092 0.1483 0.1690 0.2116 0.2602 0.2419 0.3019 0.2543
VGG-16 CUB200-2011 0.1285 0.1202 0.1764 0.0972 0.1990 0.2803 0.2100 0.3133 0.1945
AlexNet CelebA 0.0687 0.1068 - - - 0.3272 0.2597 0.3239 0.2657
Input
Original
DNN
w\ additional 
layers
Complex
dec(a’)
Complex
dec(x)
Quaternion
dec(x)
Quaternion
dec(a’)
Figure 4. Reconstructed examples. Left: images from the CelebA dataset; right: images from the CIFAR-10 dataset.
Table 2. Classification error rates on variety of models and datasets.
Model Dataset
Original
DNN
w/ additional
layers
Noisy DNN
γ = 0.2
Noisy DNN
γ = 0.5
Noisy DNN
γ = 1.0
Complex
NN QNN
LeNet CIFAR-10 19.78 21.52 24.15 27.53 34.43 17.95 11.45
LeNet CIFAR-100 51.45 49.85 56.65 67.66 78.82 49.76 37.78
ResNet-56 CIFAR-100 53.26 44.38 57.24 61.31 74.17 44.37 44.86
ResNet-110 CIFAR-100 50.64 44.93 55.19 61.12 71.31 50.94 42.05
VGG-16 CUB200-2011 56.78 63.47 69.20 99.48 99.48 78.50 70.86
AlexNet CelebA 14.17 9.49 - - - 15.94 8.80
and tested the attacker with the output of D. The second
inversion attack trained and tested the attacker with the en-
crypted quaternion-valued features. To mimic the procedure
of hacking the privacy, we randomly sampled the rotation
axis and rotation angle for 1000 times. The sample with the
highest output of the discriminator was considered as the
optimal feature to reconstruct the original image.
• Inference attacker: For the inference attack, we used the
CelebA and CIFAR-100 datasets for testing. For the CelebA
dataset, we selected 10 attributes as private attributes. We
revised an AlexNet to a QNN, and trained the QNN to es-
timate other 30 attributes, whereas the attacker based on
ResNet-50 used the intermediate-layer feature to estimate
private attributes. For the CIFAR-100 dataset, we trained
a quaternion-valued ResNet-56 to classify major 20 super-
classes of CIFAR-100. The attacker was constructed based
on ResNet-56, and used the intermediate-layer feature to
Figure 5. CelebA images reconstructed using different phases. The
first image of every two rows is the input image. We pick the most
meaningful images.
infer 100 minor classes, which were considered as sensitive
information in this experiment.
Evaluation metrics of privacy protection: We used four
metrics to evaluate the performance of privacy protection in
terms of inversion attackers: (1) the pixel-level reconstruc-
tion error E[‖Iˆ − I‖], where the pixel value was scaled to
[0, 1]. (2) The average difference angle ∆θ between xR
∗
and
xRˆ, where xR
∗
= R∗iR
∗
and xRˆ were unit quaternion vec-
tors of x-axis after rotation usingR∗ and Rˆ, respectively. (3)
The rank of the estimated sample. Let us recover two sam-
ples using two similar phases. According to our experience,
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Table 3. Failure rate of identifying the reconstructed image by human annotators.
Model Dataset OriginalDNN
w/ additional
layers
Noisy DNN
γ = 0.2
Noisy DNN
γ = 0.5
Noisy DNN
γ = 1.0
Complex
dec(a′)
Complex
dec(x)
Quaternion
dec(a′)
Quaternion
dec(x)
LeNet CIFAR-10 0.16 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.82 0.92 0.90 0.96
LeNet CIFAR-100 0.16 0.12 0.20 0.64 0.72 0.80 0.92 0.94 1.00
ResNet-56 CIFAR-100 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.36 0.72 0.88 0.90 1.00
ResNEt-110 CIFAR-100 0.04 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.36 0.80 0.86 0.94 0.98
VGG-16 CUB200-2011 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.74
AlexNet CelebA 0.04 0.24 - - - 0.96 1.00 0.84 1.00
Table 4. Average error of the estimation angle and the failure rate.
Complex error and quaternion error represented the average error
of estimated phase on Complex NN and QNN, respectively.
Average Error
Model Dataset ComplexError
Quaternion
Error
ResNet-20 CIFAR-10 0.7890±0.3722 1.4803±0.7004
ResNet-32 CIFAR-10 0.7820±0.3630 1.3322±0.6785
ResNet-44 CIFAR-10 0.8411±0.6200 1.4610±0.6905
ResNet-56 CIFAR-10 0.8088±0.5848 1.4733±0.6932
ResNet-110 CIFAR-10 0.8048±0.4535 1.4461±0.6955
LeNet CIFAR-10 0.7884±0.4147 1.3511±0.6765
LeNet CIFAR-100 0.8046±0.5279 1.3842±0.6694
ResNet-56 CIFAR-100 0.7898±0.5544 1.3837±0.7010
ResNet-110 CIFAR-100 0.7878±0.3775 1.3515±0.6558
VGG-16 CUB200 1.5572±0.8778 1.3589±0.7120
AlexNet CelebA 0.8500±0.5811 1.3833±0.6767
Table 5. Experimental results of inference attackers. net(I), net(a′),
net(Iˆ), k-NN represented the first, the second, the third, and the
forth inference attacker, respectively.
Classification
Error Rate net(I) net(a
′) net(Iˆ) k-NN
Structure k = 1 k = 3 k = 5
C
IF
A
R
-
10
0 w/ additional layers 18.73 68.72 38.50 40.28 73.38 68.37 71.16Complex NN 26.77 94.53 87.17 89.56 94.44 93.63 92.50
QNN 21.60 96.73 94.22 95.25 98.19 97.60 97.42
C
el
eb
A w/ additional layers 8.04 19.14 13.17 14.01 20.14 17.26 16.20
Complex NN 14.75 25.72 22.21 22.61 31.69 27.90 26.41
QNN 8.20 25.03 22.19 23.26 32.77 28.81 27.42
when the angle between phases was less than ∆θ = 5◦,
the two samples usually presented the same object entity.
Thus, we estimated the number of object entities that were
more similar to the input than the recovered sample. For
the QNN, the rank of the estimated sample is computed as
2
1−cos∆θ . For the Complex NN, the rank of the estimated
sample is computed as 2pi∆θ . (4) The reconstruction failure
rate of human identification, i.e. we used human annotators
to judge whether they can identify the input based on the
reconstructed sample Iˆ . For the privacy performance of
inference attacks, we could use the accuracy of attackers
as the evaluation metric. What’s more, we can compute
the processing speed of different models to measure the
efficiency of QNNs.
Experimental Results and Analysis: Table 1 and Table 2
show the performance of QNNs and baselines. Complex
dec(a′) and Complex dec(x) represented the first inversion
Table 6. Rank of the estimated sample (first row), and time cost of
inference (second row).
w/ additional
layers
Complex
NN QNN
Homomorphic
encryption
Rank - 36 525.6 -
Time cost
(s/image) 0.0004 0.0007 0.0011 3.56
attacker and the second inversion attacker on Complex NN,
respectively. Quaternion dec(a′) and Quaternion dec(x)
represented the first inversion attacker and the second inver-
sion attacker on QNN, respectively. Classification error rate
results showed that QNNs achieved a better performance
than Complex NNs. Compared with Original DNN and
DNNs with additional layers, the accuracy of QNNs was
not significantly affected. As for the reconstruction error,
a higher value indicated a better privacy protection perfor-
mance. The reconstruction error of QNNs was higher than
other networks, i.e. QNNs exhibited better performance of
privacy protection than other networks.
Fig. 4 visualizes several examples from inversion attack-
ers. We only provided results from partial experiments
constrained by the space. Table 4 shows averages and stan-
dard errors of ∆θ. A smaller value of the average of ∆θ
indicated that attackers were easier to estimate the target
phase. Table 3 shows the subjective failure rate according
to the judgement of humans. Attackers could not fetch the
input information from encrypted features. It was more
difficult to estimate the target phase of quaternion-valued
features than complex-valued features.
Table 5 shows the result of inference attackers. A higher
value of inference error indicated a better privacy protection
performance. Attackers on QNNs had a higher inference
classification error than attackers on DNNs with additional
layers, and attackers on Complex NN. Thus, QNNs pro-
tected private attributes from attackers more effectively.
Fig. 5 shows images reconstructed using different phases.
Table 6 shows the rank of the estimated sample. A higher
rank value indicated better performance of privacy protec-
tion. The rank of the QNN was higher than the Complex
NN. I.e. it was more difficult for attackers on QNNs to find
the target phase than attackers on Complex NNs.
Table 6 also shows the time cost of the inference process of
DNNs. The time cost of homomorphic encryption was from
Deep Quaternion Features for Privacy Protection
the framework Gazelle (Juvekar et al., 2018), which trained
a small network with 3 fully-connected layers from (Mohas-
sel & Zhang, 2017) using the CIFAR-10 dataset. For other
networks, we used networks revised from the ResNet-56,
which were deeper than the network used by Gazelle. How-
ever, the inference time cost of the QNN was much less than
Gazelle, and was comparable with traditional DNNs.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a method to protect the privacy
of inputs. Our method transforms traditional neural net-
works into QNNs, which use quaternion-valued features as
intermediate-layer features. The input information is hidden
in a random phase of quaternion-valued features. Experi-
ments showed the effectiveness of the privacy protection of
QNNs. The QNN has much lower computational cost than
the homomorphic encryption.
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